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Jurisdictional Competition in the
European Community
1. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, a company’s internal affairs are governed by its state of 
incorporation without regard to where it actually conducts its affairs.1  In addition, a company is 
free to select the state in which it incorporates. A company’s free choice of jurisdictional 
incorporation, combined with the rule that the jurisdiction in which a company incorporates 
governs the company’s internal affairs, underpins the regulatory competition 2 and de facto 
national convergence that exists in the United States through Delaware General Corporation 
Law.3  This general type of corporate law doctrine is known as “state of incorporation” theory.4
In the European Community (“EC”) , however, neither regulatory competition nor 
convergence have traditionally existed, since a corporation’s state of incorporation did not 
necessarily govern its internal affairs in other jurisdictions.5  Although certain EC Member States 
such as the United Kingdom and Denmark applied state of incorporation corporate law theory,
most Member States such as France and Germany did not.6  Instead, they applied a doctrine that 
dictated that the law of a company’s real seat governed a company’s internal affairs.7  A 
company’s real seat included either the jurisdiction where it had its principal place of business or 
1 See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 329, 350 (2001).
2
 For a discussion of regulatory competition in the United States and its positive or negative implications, 
see infra note 177.
3 See Gilson, supra note 1, at 350.
4 Id.
5 See id.
6 See P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 Duke L.J. 1, 51 (1985) (noting that most 
countries in continental Europe use the real seat rule).
7 See Gilson, supra note 1, at 350.
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its headquarters.8  This general type of corporate law doctrine is known as the “‘real seat’ 
doctrine.”9
Until recently, the real seat doctrine has prevented jurisdictional competition in corporate 
law in the EC by restricting forum shopping.10  Hanna Birkmose, a noted European Union 
(“EU”) scholar, suggests that this situation may have changed as a consequence of the judgment 
in the Centros case.11  Two additional cases12 after Centros, Uberseering and Inspire Art, also 
impact this situation as they apply Articles 4313 and 4814 of the EC Treaty on the freedom of 
establishment to further limit the application of a host Member State’s national law regarding 
8
 For a brief summary of the real seat doctrine, see STEFANO LOMBARDO, REGULATORY COMPETITION IN 
COMPANY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: PREREQUISITES AND LIMITS 25-27 (2002) (noting that 
the real seat theory “applies to a company, the law of the country where the management has its stable 
seat(headquarters) or the company has its major place of business (siege reel, central office), 
independently of the law of the country where the company has its registered office.”).
9
 Gilson, supra note 1, at 350.
10
 See Hanna Sondergaard Birkmose, The Fear of the Delaware-Effect - The American Demon, in THE 
INTERNATIONALISATION OF COMPANIES AND COMPANY LAW 244 (Mette Neville & Karsten Engsig 
Sorensen eds., 2001).  As a result of the widespread application of the siege reel theory in the European
Union, forum shopping has been severely restricted.”)
11
 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459.
12
 Case C-208/00, Uberseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 
2002 E.C.R. I-09919, available at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=620
00J0208&model=guichett; Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. 
Inspire Art Ltd. (2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-
bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&docrequire=alldocs&numaff=C-
167%2F01&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100.
13
 Article 43 reads in relevant part:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions of the freedom of 
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State 
shall be prohibited.  Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up of 
agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the 
territory of any Member State.
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Dec. 24, 2002, art. 43, O.J. (C 325/28) (2002) 
[hereinafter EC TREATY].
14
 Article 48 reads in relevant part:
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having 
their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the 
Community shall . . . be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of 
Member States.
EC TREATY, supra, note 13, at art. 48.
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companies that already have nationality, or legal personality,15 in another Member State.  One 
case16 before Centros, Daily Mail, also relates to this situation as Uberseering and Inspire Art
have affirmed that Daily Mail still limits the application of the freedom of establishment in 
Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty.
This Comment ultimately attempts to answer what effects Daily Mail, Centros, 
Uberseering, and Inspire Art, in toto, will have on jurisdictional competition in corporate law in 
the EC. Section 2 analyzes the evolving jurisprudence of these four cases. Its extensive analysis 
includes a discussion of the implications of these cases for jurisdictional competition and for the 
Member States with strict laws that have sought to block the importation of relaxed rules into 
their jurisdictions. It concludes, inter alia, that these decisions of the European Court of Justice 
(“E.C.J.”) have altered the real seat doctrine enough that, at a minimum, a partial jurisdictional 
competition regarding certain issues will be possible in the case of new incorporations. Section 3 
then examines whether these cases will allow a full jurisdictional competition so as to lead to a 
race for laxity. It concludes that the reincorporation barriers are probably too high in the EC, 
given that Daily Mail still stands, and that the Tenth and Fourteenth Directives on Company Law 
have not yet been passed. Section 4 hypothetically accepts the possibility of a race in light of 
these four cases, but questions whether EC Member States will have the incentive to actually 
compete for incorporations, and if they do, whether a likely jurisdictional competition for only 
new incorporations would be efficient. Section 5 summarizes the relevance of the Societas 
Europaea (“SE”) statute, which creates the possibility of having European corporations, with 
regard to the above jurisdictional competition analysis. It explores potential loopholes in the 
15
 See infra text accompanying notes 82-83 (showing the evolution of the legal personality concept after 
Daily Mail).
16
 Case C-81/87, Regina v. HM Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue ex parte Daily Mail and 
General Trust plc, 1988 E.C.R. 5483.
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structure of the SE statute that would possibly make jurisdictional competition even more likely, 
despite the fact that SE statute generally threatens to foreclose it. Finally, Section 6 presents this 
Comment’s conclusions.
2. A DISCUSSION OF FOUR EC COMPANY LAW CASES: DAILY MAIL, CENTROS,
UBERSEERING, AND INSPIRE ART
2.1. Daily Mail
Daily Mail and General Trust plc was an investment bank incorporated as a public 
limited company17 in the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) that applied for consent under U.K. 
Section 482(1) (a)18 to transfer its central management and control to Holland.19  Its purpose in 
transferring its central management and control to Holland was to circumvent English tax law. 
Without waiting for consent, as required by Section 482(1)(a), Daily Mail opened an investment 
management office in Holland.
The United Kingdom objected to the circumvention of its national tax law. It thus argued 
that Daily Mail should sell at least part of its assets in order to reckon with British tax authorities 
before transferring its central management and control out of the United Kingdom.20  Daily Mail, 
17
 Futuramax Limited, UK Limited Companies, at
http://www.futuramax.co.uk/uk_companyformation.html (displaying a chart of features of limited 
companies in the United Kingdom).
18
 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 § 482(1).
19
 See Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R. at 5507 (“Section 482(1)(a) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 
1970 prohibits companies resident for tax purposes in the United Kingdom from ceasing to be so resident 
without the consent of the Treasury.”); see also ROBERT R. PENNINGTON, COMPANY LAW 60, n.2 
(Butterworths ed., 1979) (noting that this rule was designed to prevent companies from avoiding liability 
in tax by ceasing their residency).
20
 Specifically, the court noted that transferring its residence for tax purposes would have enabled Daily 
Mail to “sell a significant part of its non-permanent assets and to use the proceeds of that sale to buy its 
own shares, without having to pay the tax to which such transactions would make it liable under United 
Kingdom law, in regard in particular to the substantial capital gains on the assets which the applicant 
proposed to sell.”  Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R. at 5507-08.  Although Daily Mail would have subsequently 
been subject to Dutch tax law, the aforementioned series of transactions would have been taxed only with 
regard to the capital gains that accrued after the transfer of its residence for tax purposes.  Id.
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however, had other plans. It asserted that Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty gave it the right to 
transfer its central management and control to another Member State either without consent at 
all, or with the right to obtain mandatory consent.21  The E.C.J. then phrased the issue of this 
case as follows: whether Articles 43 and 48 “preclude a Member State from prohibiting a body 
corporate with its central management and control in that Member State from transferring 
without prior consent that central management and control to another Member State. . . .”22 
In deciding this issue, the E.C.J. first concluded that the provisions of Articles 43 and 48 
of the EC Treaty, which protect a company’s right of establishment, applied to the Member State 
of origin, or home Member State, despite the fact that Articles 43 and 48 were primarily directed
to ensuring that foreign nationals and companies were treated in the host Member State in the 
same way as nationals of that state.23 At the same time, the Court opined that the establishment 
rights under Articles 43 and 48 would be rendered “meaningless” if a home Member State could 
flat out prohibit corporations established under its laws from leaving in order to establish 
themselves in host Member States.24 
After deciding this issue, the Court noted that the freedom of establishment in Article 43 
conferred the right upon companies established in a home Member State to set up “agencies, 
branches or subsidiaries” in host Member States.25  Daily Mail’s management office fell within 
the definition of agencies, branches or subsidiaries.26  However, the Court ultimately held that 
the U.K. tax law did not impinge on Daily Mail’s freedom of establishment because the United 
21
 Id.
22
 Case C-81/87, Regina v. HM Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue ex parte Daily Mail and 
General Trust plc, 1988 E.C.R. 5483, 5508.
23
 Id. at 5510.
24
 Id.
25
 Id. at 5511.
26
 See id. (“[T]his is the form of establishment in which the applicant engaged in this case. . . .”).
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Kingdom merely limited Daily Mail from transferring its central management and control out of 
the United Kingdom while maintaining “its legal personality and its status as a United Kingdom 
company.”27 
2.1.1. A Critical Analysis and Exploration of Daily Mail
Daily Mail’s holding suggested the following. If Daily Mail’s operation in the 
Netherlands was a branch and if Articles 43 and 48 granted a right of establishment to a 
company incorporated in home Member State A to set up a branch in a host Member State B, 
then it would seem that home Member State A could not have imposed any restrictions on Daily 
Mail’s movement without violating its establishment right.
In Daily Mail, however, the Court interestingly took the view that the freedom of 
establishment provisions never applied, since home Member State A law (U.K. law) did not 
actually prevent companies from setting up branches28 as companies could wind-up.29  This 
would allow a company to divest itself of legal personality under the home Member State’s law. 
Thus, in sum, although the Daily Mail court’s holding narrowly applied to home Member States, 
it potentially broadly implied that the confluence of two events would technically mean that a 
Member State’s restriction of a company’s movement would not be a specific limitation of that 
company’s freedom of establishment right. These two events were: 1) residence transfer or 
27
 Id.
28
 See supra text accompanying note 13 (showing the EC Treaty origin of the branch issue); Werner 
Ebke, Centros - Some Realities and Some Mysteries, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 623, 629 (2000), (noting that the 
right to set up branches, agencies, and subsidiaries is covered by the concept of secondary establishment).
29
 Case C-81/87, Regina v. HM Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue ex parte Daily Mail and 
General Trust plc, 1988 E.C.R. 5483, 5511.
7 of 57
transferring management and control; and 2) maintaining legal personality status in a Member 
State.30 
After Daily Mail, it thus appeared that a Member State’s law could effectively interfere 
with the very purpose of Articles 43 and 48, the right of a company incorporated in one Member 
State to set up a branch in another Member State, without violating these provisions.31  This 
suggested that the right of secondary establishment, i.e., the right to set up agencies, branches or 
subsidiaries, although recognized doctrinally as a full right, would yield to at least two 
conditions.
The first condition, residence transfer, was the very circumstance that would have 
allowed Daily Mail to evade U.K. tax law. As the Court noted, “only companies which are 
resident for tax purposes in the United Kingdom are as a rule liable to United Kingdom 
corporation tax.”32 The cynic might have concluded that the Court was looking for a way to stop 
the circumvention of U.K. law. This is especially so considering that the opinion of the 
Advocate General to the Court stated: “As a general rule it appears that the national court may 
assess whether, in a specific case and having regard to the circumstances, there is a suggestion of 
abuse of a right or circumvention of the law and whether it should decide not to apply 
Community law.”33  Although the Court did not conclude that a State can refuse to apply EC law 
where there was intent to circumvent national law, it is clear that such reasoning might have been 
at the back of its mind.
30
 Id. (“It requires Treasury consent only where such a company seeks to transfer its central management 
and control out of the United Kingdom while maintaining its legal personality and its status as a United 
Kingdom company.”).
31
 See id. (suggesting a conflict between a company’s primary establishment right to choose which legal 
regime applies and a Member State’s right to control companies that come within its national law).
32
 Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R. at 5507.
33
 Id., 1988 E.C.R. at 5502-03 (opinion of Mr. Advocate General Darmon).
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The second condition, legal personality, was an attempt to reconcile freedom of 
establishment with the traditional notion that “unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of 
the law34 and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national law.”35  It, combined 
with the residence transfer condition, suggested that even host Member States who applied the 
real seat doctrine could perhaps restrict company immigration when a company’s real seat 
residence was transferred, since the transfer might have created legal personality in the real seat 
state.36
These implications were merely speculative. In black letter law, Daily Mail never stated 
a principle against circumvention. One might even see its failure to explicitly assert such a 
principle, which was stated in the Advocate General’s opinion, as evidence that the Court never 
intended to wholly prevent circumvention of national law.
2.2. Centros
Centros Ltd. was a private limited company37 that was incorporated in the U.K.38 
Centros, since its inception, never traded in the U.K.  It anyhow sought to establish a place of 
34
 See Ebke, supra note 28, at 636 (noting that Member States generally give automatic recognition to 
companies that are formed under other Member States’ national laws).
35
 Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R. at 5511.
36
 This also would have tacitly held back circumvention of national laws.  For example, if a new company 
C incorporated in home Member State A decided to transfer its principal operations to host Member State 
B (a real seat doctrine state) in order to avoid B’s stricter company law requirements, B, even though 
circumvention was not stated as contrary to Community law, could presumably have been able to not 
recognize A.  For the resolution of this issue, see infra Section 2.3.
37
 Futuramax Limited, UK Limited Companies (displaying a chart of features of limited companies in the 
U.K.), at http://www.futuramax.co.uk/uk_companyformation.html.
38
 See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459, I-1487 
(explaining that a Ltd. is a private limited company in the U.K.); see also LOMBARDO, supra note 8, at 39 
(noting that harmonization of capital requirements had not been achieved for the private limited company 
form).
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business in Denmark. Centros was owned by two Danish nationals residing in Denmark, whose 
intent was to use U.K. incorporation to circumvent Danish minimum capital requirements.39 
Danish law article 117(l),40 in accord with Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty, provided 
that foreign companies had a right to set up a branch.41  Denmark, however, tried to refuse 
registration to Centros on the grounds that it had not established a branch. Denmark instead 
asserted that Centros’s establishment in Denmark was a “principal establishment”42 as it was 
established merely to circumvent the national law on minimum capital requirements and as it had 
never traded in the United Kingdom.43 
Centros contended that the establishment satisfied the conditions for a “branch” and that 
the right of establishment in Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty allowed it, as a duly formed 
U.K. company, to set up a branch in Denmark.44  It also asserted that the fact that it had not 
traded in the U.K. did not affect its freedom of establishment.45 
The Court first dismissed the relevance of Denmark’s principal establishment argument,46 
thereby very broadly construing “agencies, branches, or subsidiaries” in Article 43.47  It then 
proceeded to phrase a broader more important issue, “whether or not a member state may adopt 
39
 Id.
40
 Anpartsselskabslov art. 117(1).
41
 See Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at I-1488 (“Private limited companies and foreign companies having a similar 
legal form which are established in one Member State of the European Communities may do business in 
Denmark through a branch.”).
42
 Id.  See also Ebke, supra note 28, at 632-33 (noting that some scholars have construed principal 
establishment to encompass primary establishment and presenting the foundations of the debate).
43
 Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at I-1487-90 (detailing Denmark’s attempt to merge the issues of circumvention 
and principal establishment).
44
 Id. at I-1488.
45
 Id. at I-1489.
46
 See id. at I-1490 (citing Case 79/85, Segers v. Berijtsvereniging voor Bank-en Verzekeringswegen, 
Groothandel en Vrije Beroepen, 1986 E.C.R. 2375).
47
 EC TREATY, supra note 13, at art. 43.
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measures in order to prevent attempts by certain of its nationals to evade domestic legislation by 
having recourse to the possibilities offered by the Treaty.”48 
In answering this question, the Court first discussed Articles 43 and 48. It then stated:
The immediate consequence of [Articles 43 and 48] is that . . . companies are 
entitled to carry on their business in another member state through an agency, 
branch or subsidiary. The location of their registered office, central 
administration or principal place of business serves as the connecting factor with 
the legal system of a particular state in the same way as does nationality in the 
case of a natural person.49
The Court then expressly noted the argument, previously discussed with regard to the 
opinion in Daily Mail, that a Member State was entitled to take measures to prevent nationals 
from improperly circumventing national legislation.50  It concluded that intentional 
circumvention itself did not constitute an “abuse” of the right of establishment.51  Its reason was 
as follows:
The provisions of the [EC] Treaty on freedom of establishment are intended 
specifically to enable companies formed in accordance with the law of a member 
state and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of 
business within the Community to pursue activities in other member states 
through an agency, branch or subsidiary.52 
Although the Court ruled that circumvention was not illegal, it simultaneously made a 
contrary suggestion by hinting at the possibility of a different outcome had the Danish law dealt 
48
 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459, I-1491.
49
 Id.
50
 See id. at I-1492 (citing multiple cases for this proposition, including Case 115/78, Knoors v. Secretary 
of State for Economic Affairs, 1979 E.C.R. 399; Case 33/74, van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van 
Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheld, 1974 E.C.R. 1299).
51
 Id. at I-1493.
52
 Eddy Wymeersch saw this language as eliminating “the question whether the branch was not de facto a 
head office.”  Eddy Wymeersch, Centros: A Landmark Decision in European Company Law, in
CORPORATIONS, CAPITAL MARKETS AND BUSINESS IN THE LAW (Th. Baums et al. eds., 1999) (working 
paper at 4) [hereinafter Wymeersch, Centros].
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with the “carrying on of certain trades, professions or businesses” as opposed to denying 
registration.53 
After this holding, the Court proceeded to consider, “whether the national practice in 
question might not be justified. . . .54 Denmark asserted that its refusal to register Centros, which 
was incompatible with Articles 43 and 48, was justified because minimum capital requirements 
that prevented Centros’ Danish registration protected creditors.55  The Court rejected Denmark’s 
justification measures. It stated that these measures must be non-discriminatory, justified by 
imperative requirements in the general interest, suitable for securing the attainment of the 
objective, and necessary.56  However, it implied that justifications would succeed when they 
were first less restrictive. As an example, it stated that Denmark could “mak[e] it possible in law 
for public creditors to obtain the necessary guarantees.”57 It also suggested that measures would 
be justified when a company abused the freedom of establishment through fraudulent 
circumvention.58 
53
 This suggestions, however, was somewhat puzzling because it was inconsistent with the language of 
the Court that stated that the provisions were designed to ensure that companies could pursue activities in 
other Member States.  See Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at I-1493 (“pursue activities in other Member 
States. . . .”).  See also EC TREATY, supra note 13, at art. 43 (“right to . . . manage undertakings. . . .”).  
Ultimately, this hint became the basis of the strict Member States’ argument in Inspire Art.  See infra
Section 2.4. (discussing how strict Member States argued that restrictive laws that did not affect company 
registration would not conflict with Freedom of Establishment).
54
 Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at I-1494.
55
 See id. (explaining the goal of protecting both public creditors as well as other creditors).
56
 Id. at I-1495.
57
 Id. at I-1496.
58
 The Court stated that Denmark could adopt:
any appropriate measure for preventing or penalizing fraud . . . where it has been 
established that [people] are in fact attempting, by means of the formation of the 
company, to evade their obligations towards private or public creditors established on the 
territory of a member state concerned.
Id.
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2.2.1. A Critical Analysis and Exploration of Centros
Centros led to significant academic debate. Many scholars found the case surprising.59 
However, Centros is doctrinally consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence in Daily Mail. Under 
Daily Mail, one would have expected the Court to analyze the Centros situation as follows.
Centros, incorporated in home Member State A, would have a right to establish a branch 
in host Member State B. Centros has such a right to establish a branch even though it is
transferring its central management and control. This follows from the fact, as previously 
mentioned, that the Daily Mail Court acknowledged that Daily Mail’s establishment in the 
Netherlands constituted a transfer of central management and control. In Centros, host Member 
State B was not a real seat state, but a state of incorporation60 state. As such, host Member 
State B had no argument, under Daily Mail, that it granted legal personality to Centros. Since 
legal personality was an additional condition for a Member State’s restrictions not to conflict 
with freedom of establishment, Denmark would violate Centros’s freedom of establishment.
However, despite the doctrinal consistency, it could be believed that the Court in Centros
was beginning to shift philosophical gears.61  There are a number of arguments in support of this. 
First, the Court’s decision in Centros came down in favor of the circumventing company, 
59
 See Ebke, supra note 28, at 627 (noting that some scholars actually viewed this case as hailing the 
abolishment of the real seat theory.).  Scholars of this sort often additionally maintained that the 
“Delaware rule in Europe would entail the much dreaded ‘race to the bottom.’”  Wymeersch, Centros, 
supra note 52, at 2.  But Cf. Ebke, supra note 28, at 660 (taking the view that Centros only expanded the 
scope of the term “branch” in Article 43(1) and added little to the meaning of primary establishment or 
the abolishment of the real seat theory).
60
 See Lombardo, supra note 8, at 25-27 (explaining that under the traditional Anglo-Saxon state of 
incorporation theory, a company is viewed as a legal entity of the law of the country of incorporation and 
is subject to its law).
61
 But cf. Wymeersch, Centros, supra, note 52, at 3 (discussing how some scholars took a more extreme 
view that Centros was a ‘breakthrough’ doctrine).
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whereas the Daily Mail decision had come down in favor of the Member State protecting its 
national law.
Second, the Court in Centros specifically addressed whether circumventing national law 
would justify a Member State refusing to give effect to EC law in the freedom of establishment 
context. As was previously mentioned, the Daily Mail Court steered around this issue, even 
though it was addressed in the Advocate General’s opinion.62  One might have therefore thought, 
after Daily Mail, that circumvention of national law was incompatible with the freedom of 
establishment. In Centros, there is a clear answer. It is not incompatible.
The Centros Court was interestingly almost forced into a position where it had to address 
the dreaded question of the relationship between circumvention of national law and the freedom 
of establishment. Under the Daily Mail standard, Denmark would have clearly infringed as there 
was no argument that Centros had legal personality in a state of incorporation nation. The Court 
therefore had two choices.
It could have held that legal personality was no longer necessary to avoid conflict with 
the freedom of establishment and eroded Daily Mail. This would have meant that a transfer of 
management and control was sufficient to avoid such a conflict.
The other option was to leave Daily Mail intact doctrinally, which meant deciding 
whether measures dealing with circumvention of national law by themselves conflicted with the 
freedom of establishment. Had the Court decided that these measures did not conflict with 
freedom of establishment, it would have ironically eroded Daily Mail. Almost any transfer of 
central management and control would have been susceptible to being classified as an attempt to 
62
 See supra text accompanying note 32 (discussing how the Advocate General’s opinion suggested that 
circumvention was by itself incompatible with the Freedom of Establishment)
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circumvent national law. This would have effectively dispensed with the legal personality 
requirement.
Thus, in essence, the result in Centros was the only way to maintain doctrinal consistency 
with Daily Mail. The price of this doctrinal consistency was a philosophical concession. If it is 
shocking, it is not because it is a major departure from Daily Mail. Instead, it is a departure from 
1970s cases like Knoors and Van Binsberg.63  When the Daily Mail Court based its holding on 
the concurrence of a company’s transfer of central management and a Member State conferring 
legal personality on a company, the E.C.J. had already taken a major step toward this 
jurisprudence.
More important than what it doctrinally announced, the Centros decision showed that it 
would not stretch doctrine to satisfy a circumventionist position. Since this case did not 
implicate the issue of legal personality, it did little to clarify the tension between companies as 
creatures of national law and beneficiaries of the freedom of establishment. This tension ran 
even deeper than circumvention issues.
2.3. Uberseering
Uberseering B.V.64 was a limited company incorporated in the Netherlands, a state of 
incorporation Member State.65 In 1990, Uberseering contracted NCC GmbH,66 a private limited 
63
 See supra text accompanying note 59 (noting that these two cases supported the circumventionist 
position).  It should, however, be noted that the 1970s precedent is not unequivocal.  See supra text 
accompanying note 56 (demonstrating that the Segers case could easily imply that circumvention should 
not affect EC law with regard to freedom of establishment).
64
 See The Company Limited by Shares (Ltd.), (comparing the B.V. limited company structure in Holland 
to the U.K. limited company), at http://www.hjc.nl/english.htm.
65
 See Case C-208/00, Uberseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 
2002 E.C.R. I-09919, at para. 2, available at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=620
00J0208&model=guichettUberseering.
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company established in Germany (a real seat state), to perform work on property that it had 
acquired in Germany.67  Uberseering claimed that NCC’s work was defective and brought an 
action before the Landgericht, the equivalent of a federal district court in Germany.68 
It dismissed the action.69  German civil procedure70 provided that an action brought by a 
party which does not have legal personality must be dismissed.71  According to German law, a 
company’s legal capacity was determined by reference to the applicable law in its “actual centre 
of administration.”72 The Landgericht concluded that Uberseering had transferred its actual 
centre of administration to Dusseldorf merely because two German nationals had acquired all the 
shares in Uberseering.73 Its own determination of a residence transfer was thus the basis for the 
dismissal.
Since the actual center of administration was transferred to Germany for purposes of 
German law, the Oberlandesgericht,74 which is equivalent to a federal court of appeals in the 
United States, concluded on the basis of its national law that German law should apply. German 
law then required reincorporation in Germany in order to bring legal proceedings. Since 
66
 See CHARLOTTE VILLIERS, EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW - TOWARDS DEMOCRACY? 25-26 (1998) 
(explaining that the GmbH is a German private limited company and describing its basic characteristics).
67
 Uberseering, 2002 E.C.R. I-09919, at paras. 2, 6.
68
 See Ebke, Centros, supra note 28, at 650 (explaining that the Landgericht is a German District Court).
69
 See Uberseering, 2002 E.C.R. I-09919, at para. 9 (noting that a higher regional court upheld the 
dismissal).
70
 Zivilprozessordnung ¶ 50(1).
71
 See Uberseering, 2002 E.C.R. 1-09919, at para. 3 (potentially allowing Germany to use the concept of 
legal personality to deny legal capacity).
72
 Id. at para. 4.
73
 Id. at para. 9.
74
 See id. at para. 9 (stating that the Oberlandesgericht reviewed the Landgericht’s initial dismissal 
decision); Ebke, supra note 28, at 652 (noting that the Oberlandesgericht is equivalent to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals).
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Uberseering did not reincorporate in Germany, it was found to lack standing and was denied the 
capacity to bring legal proceedings.75 
This case was later referred to the E.C.J. by the Bundesgerichtshof,76 the German 
equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court, under Article 234.77 Article 234 is the EC statute that sets 
forth under what conditions the E.C.J. will have jurisdiction over matters relating to preliminary 
rulings by Member States.
Uberseering then asserted that Germany violated its freedom of establishment by denying 
its legal capacity. Germany asserted that freedom of establishment did not apply at all in this 
context.78 In particular, Germany invoked Daily Mail.79 
The Court first distinguished Uberseering from Daily Mail on the basis that the real seat 
doctrine did not confer “legal personality.”80 Just because Germany determined that Uberseering 
75
 Uberseering, 2002 E.C.R. 1-09919, at para. 9.
76
 See Ebke, supra note 28, at 657 (explaining that the Bundesgerichtshof is equivalent to the U.S. 
Supreme Court).
77
 Article 234 provides in relevant part:
The Court of Justice hall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:  (a) the 
interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions
of the Community and the ECB; (c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established 
by an act of Council, where those statutes so provide.
EC TREATY, supra note 13, at art. 234.
78
 The court stated:
In limine and contrary to the submissions of both NCC and the German, Spanish and 
Italian Governments, the court must make clear that where a company which is validly 
incorporated in one Member State (‘A’) in which it has its registered office is deemed, 
under the law of a second Member State (‘B’), to have moved its actual centre of 
administration to Member State B following the transfer of all its shares to nationals of 
that State residing there, the rules which Member State B applies to that company do not, 
as community law now stands, fall outside the scope of the community provisions 
freedom of establishment.
Uberseering, 2002 E.C.R. 1-09919, at para. 52.
79
 See id. at para. 61 (noting that Germany tried to assimilate the Daily Mail situation to justify denying 
legal capacity to Uberseering).
80
 The court specifically stated:
It must be stressed that, unlike Daily Mail and General Trust, which concerned relations 
between a company and the Member State under whose laws it had been incorporated in 
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had made Germany its real seat, legal personality was not automatically conferred. It then 
proceeded to address whether Germany could find that Uberseering had transferred its actual 
center of administration to Germany even though Holland, its ‘original’ home Member State in 
which it was incorporated, had never called “[i]ts legal existence . . . in question. . . .”81 
Transferring central administration was the other circumstance in Daily Mail that allowed 
a Member State to restrict companies, without violating Articles 43 and 48. The Court did not 
give any definitive decision on whether Germany could so construe Uberseering, but strongly
implied that it could not.82 It then suggested that neither the existence of legal personality nor 
the transfer of the center of actual administration mattered. It simply refused to apply the Daily 
Mail circumstances that allowed Member State restrictions on immigrating companies by host 
Member States. Thus, it stated:
[U]nlike the case before the national court in this instance, Daily Mail and 
General Trust did not concern the way in which one Member State treats a 
company which is validly incorporated in another Member State and which is 
exercising its freedom of establishment in the first Member State.83 
This had the effect of narrowly confining Daily Mail to its articulated conclusion in the 
context of company emigration.84 The Court asserted that the rationale for its decision was 
a situation where the company wished to transfer its actual centre of administration to 
another Member State whilst retaining its legal personality in the State of incorporation, 
the present case concerns the recognition by one Member State of a company 
incorporated under the law of another Member State, such a company being denied all 
legal capacity in the host Member State where it takes the view that the company had 
moved its actual centre of administration to its territory, irrespective of whether in that 
regard the company actually intended to transfer its seat.
Id. at para. 62.
81
 Id. at para. 63.
82
 “[E]ven if the dispute . . . is seen as concerning a transfer of the actual centre of administration. . . .”  
Id. at para. 64.
83
 Id. at para. 66.
84
 See Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R. at I-5512.  (“Articles 52 and 58 (now 43 and 48) of the Treaty, properly 
construed, confer no right on a company incorporated under the legislation of a Member State and having 
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consistent with that of Daily Mail, which had decided on the basis of the principle that the 
company is a “creature of national law.”85 
It then held that Uberseering had the right to rely on freedom of establishment to contest 
the German law that had denied it legal capacity as well as personality.86
In its next increment, the Court considered whether Germany restricted Uberseering’s 
freedom of establishment.87 It concluded that there was a restriction, since the Netherlands, 
which was Uberseering’s initial home Member State, had continued to recognize Uberseering’s 
legal personality.88 Moreover, it declared that the German reincorporation requirement was 
“tantamount to outright negation of freedom of establishment.”89 Its rationale was again that “a 
company exists only by virtue of the national legislation which determines its incorporation and 
functioning.”90 
2.3.1. A Critical Analysis and Exploration of Uberseering
Uberseering is significant in EC freedom of establishment jurisprudence for a number of 
reasons. Like the previous cases in this line, the effect of the German law in Uberseering would 
have been to halt those companies trying to circumvent national law. After the decision in 
Centros held that circumvention by itself could not justify measures that restricted freedom of 
its registered office there to transfer its central management and control to another Member State.”).  In 
the words of the Uberseering Court, the Daily Mail Court “concluded that a Member State was able, in 
the case of a company incorporated under its law, to make the company’s right to retain its legal 
personality under the law of that State subject to restrictions on the transfer of the company’s actual 
centre of administration to a foreign country.”  Uberseering, 2002 E.C.R. I-09919, at para. 70.
85
 Uberseering, 2002 E.C.R. I-09919, at para. 67.
86
 See id. at para. 76 (“It follows . . . that Uberseering is entitled to rely on the principle of freedom of 
establishment in order to contest the refusal of German law to regard it as a legal person with the capacity 
to be a party to legal proceedings.”).
87
 Id. at para. 78.
88
 See id. at para. 80 (implying that a Member State’s determination of legal personality should not 
conflict with a prior Member State’s determination on this subject).
89
 Id. at para. 81.
90
 Id. at para. 81.
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establishment, Germany was foreclosed from arguing that its national law was valid on this 
basis. As a result, Germany tried to see whether it could use Daily Mail to maneuver around 
Centros. This required placing the more fundamental issue of the bounds of national company 
law before the Court.
Since Germany was a real seat state, it had a strong argument that it could do so. This 
was in fact the first case in this line where a company incorporated in home Member State A had 
immigrated to host Member State B, a real seat state. In Centros, host Member State B was a 
state of incorporation state. As such, Denmark had no claim to conferring legal personality on 
Centros. Thus, the Daily Mail circumstances could have been of no use in that context. Nor 
could Germany’s arguments have potentially availed it. A claim that Centros transferred its
central administration would not have been enough, since the Court had already twice held that 
establishing central administration was not incompatible with the concept of a “branch”91 that the 
Treaty had upheld. In the case of a real seat state, however, it was at least arguable that a 
company’s legal personality transferred with its real seat. If incorporation in a state of 
incorporation Member State conferred legal personality on a company, then it stood to reason 
that a company’s seat would confer legal personality in a real seat Member State. This 
hypothetical can be illustrated visually as follows.
91
 See supra note 13 (applying the freedom of establishment to “branches” through Article 43 of the EC 
Treaty).
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If Germany had succeeded in obtaining its desired result, real seat Member States would 
have been armed against circumvention of their national laws.92 For nearly all such 
circumventions would involve transfer of a company’s central administration, and under the real 
seat rationale, transfer of its legal personality.
92
 This aspect in particular historically prevented the competition of jurisdictions in EC company law.  
Prior to this case, Garza noted that a real seat Member State could “require another member state’s 
corporation having its principal place of business within its borders to incorporate under its own laws.  
Indeed, several member states do impose such a choice-of-corporate-law requirement (“seat rule”) to 
ensure that all corporations doing business within their boundaries are subject to the same rules of 
corporate law.  As a result, the choice of corporate law is substantially restricted by these member states.”  
Danny Ray Garza, Which Style Should Govern?, 11 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 76, 78 (2002) 
[hereinafter Garza] (discussing Werner Ebke, Company Law and the European Union: Centralized 
Versus Decentralized Lawmaking, 31 INT’L LAW 961, 962 (Winter 1997)).
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In addition, prevailing on this issue would have armed real seat Member States with an ex 
ante prophylactic measure. Germany claimed that it could decide whether a company had 
transferred its center of administration. Since it was a real seat Member State, any transfer of 
central administration would have given rise to legal personality.93 As a result, Germany and 
real seat Member States could have potentially fit almost anything into the Daily Mail
circumstances, as Germany attempted to do by arguing that its nationals’ acquiring all of 
Centros’ shares constituted such a transfer.
This is significant because it would have allowed real seat Member States to block 
companies that they deemed de facto to have circumvented national law, while state of 
incorporation Member States would have had no such rights. Since a real seat Member State in 
this scenario would have the right to block companies incorporated in a state of incorporation 
Member State when it merely deemed a company to have established its central administration in 
a real seat Member State, many companies would be forced to recognize their own incorporation 
in real seat Member States if they did not wish to paradoxically face the grave consequences of 
losing legal capacity and forced dissolution.94 
This could have had two important effects. First, it might have offset the benefits 
obtained by the more relaxed laws that Centros-like companies could obtain in certain state of
incorporation Member States. Second, it might have made it wholly unfeasible for these and 
93
 Daily Mail and Centros had essentially held, as previously noted, that the Member State could not 
determine on the basis of national law that an establishment was not a branch if it was duly formed in 
another Member State and fell within the scope of the Article 48 connecting factors.  Eddy Wymeersch in 
1999 had understandably assumed that Centros closed this issue.  See Wymeersch, Centros, supra note 
52, at 4 (“As far as the Treaty freedoms are concerned, these questions fall within community law, not 
conflicts of laws.”).  Germany’s argument in Uberseering would have effectively reversed this rule for 
real seat states.
94
 See infra Section 3 (discussing the potential consequences of forced dissolution and reincorporation).
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other companies with a remotely colorable central administration in a real seat Member State to 
not incorporate in real seat Member States.
In the first scenario, the effect would have been to preserve the existing real seat and state 
of incorporation framework in the EU. In the second scenario, it would have tended to either 
establish the dominance of or export the real seat doctrine at the expense of the incorporation
doctrine.
Real seat Member States would have had the power to control which scenario obtained to 
some degree. If they imposed very harsh measures in the case of transfer, the second scenario
would have been more likely to obtain. If the measures were less harsh, the first scenario would 
have been more likely to have obtained.
In addition, they could have further controlled this by having the power to decide when 
there was a transfer of central administration. They could have simply found such a transfer 
when they suspected circumvention. When they suspected circumvention, they could have 
imposed a measure that was sufficient to eliminate the foreign company’s benefit from
circumvention, without going further. Preserving the status quo, given the European fear of a 
race to laxity, is likely all that they would have intended. The following presents an illustration 
of this scenario.
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The Court’s conclusion is not shocking, given the inherent danger of allowing real seat 
Member States to simply assert legal personality over companies and to require them to 
reincorporate. As a result, it is understandable that the Court forcefully declared that the German 
reincorporation rule was “tantamount” to the legal personality concept.95 This was not truly 
inconsistent with Daily Mail to the extent that it could not resolve the eventual unavoidable 
conflict of two national legal personalities.96 
Situated in a netherworld between Centros and Daily Mail, the Court had two options in 
this regard. In the first case, it could have applied legal personality to uphold the German law. 
This would have resulted in the scenario described above where real seat doctrine would either 
95
 See supra text accompanying notes 77-81 (noting that in Uberseering, the real seat doctrine did not 
automatically confer legal personality).
96
 See Eddy Wymeersch, The Transfer of the Company’s Seat in the European company Law 18 (2003) 
[hereinafter Wymeersch, Transfer of the Seat], (working paper) (“It is important to note — as 
Uberseering recalls — that the court’s holding in Daily Mail is framed in terms of a state’s powers within 
its own jurisdiction, and not in terms of rules relating to a cross border relationship where the Treaty’s 
freedom of establishment limits the powers of a member state vis-à-vis companies originated from 
another member state.”), available at http://www.ecgi.org.
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prevail in the EU, or where the status quo would be maintained.97 It also might have eroded an
assumption already implicit in Daily Mail that the legal personality of the home Member State 
prevailed.
In the second case, it could have and did apply legal personality to find that the German 
law violated Uberseering’s freedom of establishment. The immediate result of its decision is 
that, at a minimum, host Member State anti-circumvention measures are severely limited where 
companies immigrate from state of incorporation Member States, since Centros further limits 
these measures in the context of a state of incorporation host Member State. This effectively 
cripples the real seat doctrine.
Moreover, the freedom of establishment will even apply in this context where there is a 
transfer of the central administration or management. This follows from the fact that in all three 
of these cases, the Court accepted that the transfer of the company’s central administration did 
not affect its freedom of establishment, or its status in the host state as a “branch.”98 This fully 
obfuscates the distinction between primary and secondary establishment.99 
Thus, companies that incorporate in state of incorporation Member States appear to have 
the carte blanche to transfer,100 with minimal fear of anti-circumvention measures, into other
Member States. The only limitations on their ability to transfer after this case were the 
justification doctrine in Centros and the emigration circumstances in Daily Mail. This allowed 
97
 See supra text accompanying Figure 3 (explaining in hypothetical terms the court’s conundrum 
regarding the legal personality issue).
98
 Although the Court in Uberseering did not accept that its central administration had been transferred, it 
asserted that such a transfer would not have affected the decision outcome.  See Uberseering at para. 64 
(noting that even in this scenario the interpretation that the German government put forth of Daily Mail 
was incorrect).
99
 But see Ebke, supra note 28 (reserving considerable doubt as to whether Centros significantly 
abolished the distinction).
100
 See Garza, supra note 92, at 78 (noting that this brings the EU much closer to the “full faith and credit 
clause” scenario in the United States).
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new companies who planned to do all or most of their business in a host Member State to take 
advantage of the more relaxed company laws of various other Member States. It is inevitable 
that certain incorporation Member States101 like the U.K. with relaxed company laws will now 
export their standards through new incorporations.
2.4. Inspire Art
Inspire Art Ltd.102 was a private limited company incorporated in the United Kingdom 
that established a branch in the Netherlands.103 Its sole director, who had independent decision 
making capacity, was located in the Netherlands.104 In addition, Inspire Art traded almost
exclusively within the Netherlands.105 
The Netherlands imposed on it certain requirements by the WFBV.106 The WFBV 
requirements were an attempt by the Netherlands, a state of incorporation Member State, to deal 
with the problem of formally foreign companies.107 Various articles imposed obligations on 
these companies:
101
 Real seat states with lax laws should be able to export law as well.  Uberseering appears to consider 
the first Member State to grant legal personality as the Member State under whose law a company was 
duly formed and therefore as the state falling within the Daily Mail legal personality concept.  See supra
text accompanying note 88 (noting that the Uberseering court held that the legal personality of a company 
in one Member State should not uproot a company’s existing legal personality in another Member State).
102
 Futuramax Limited, UK Limited Companies (displaying a chart of features of limited companies in the 
U.K.), at http://www.futuramax.co.uk/uk_companyformation.html.
103
 See Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd. (2003) 
at para. 2; see also Futuramax Limited, UK Limited Companies (displaying a chart of features of limited 
companies in the U.K.), at http://www.futuramax.co.uk/uk_companyformation.html.
104
 Inspire Art at para. 34.
105
 Id. at para. 36.
106
 Wet op de Formeel Buitenlandse Vennootschappen (“WFBV”).
107
 See Inspire Art at para. 2 (“Article 1 of the WFBV defines a formally foreign company as a capital 
company formed under laws other than those of the Netherlands and having legal personality, which 
carries on its activities entirely or almost entirely in the Netherlands and also does not have any real 
connection with the State within which the law under which the company was formed applies. . . .”).  
“Formally foreign company” thus encompassed companies like Centros.
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Articles 2 to 5 of the WFBV impose on formally foreign companies various 
obligations concerning the company’s registration in the commercial register, an 
indication of that status in all the documents produced by it, the minimum share 
capital and the drawing-up, production and publication of the annual documents. 
The WFBV also provides for penalties in case of non-compliance with those
provisions.108 
Inspire Art contended that it was not a formally foreign company. As a result, it never 
“registered as such in the commercial register of the host State”109 as required by Article 2 of the 
WFBV. In addition, it contended that the WFBV provisions were contrary to Articles 43 and 48 
of the EC Treaty.110 
The Kantongerecht,111 the lowest level court in a f our-tiered Dutch hierarch, held that 
Inspire Art was a formally foreign corporation, but refrained from ruling on the freedom of 
establishment issue. Instead, it referred this issue to the E.C.J.112 The E.C.J. interpreted this 
issue as whether Articles  43 and 48 of the EC Treaty precluded the WFBV from attaching 
additional conditions to establishment in a host Member State where a company had intent to 
circumvent stricter national company law requirements and where a company carried all or most 
of its activities on in the host state without a genuine connection to the Member State under 
whose law it was formed.113 
The Court first did not consider the relation of certain WFBV disclosure provisions 
regarding branches opened in a Member State by companies covered by the First Directive and 
108
 Id. at para. 23.
109
 Id. at paras. 24, 36.
110
 See id. at para. 37 (stating that this was an argument in the alternative to its principal argument that it 
did not meet the conditions of Article 1 of the WFBV).
111
 Pieter Ruitinga and Anthony J. Mavronicolas, Dutch Jurisdiction in Transportation Matters, 28 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 61, 61 (noting that the Dutch hierarchy consists of sixty-two cantonal courts).
112
 Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd. (2003) at 
para. 39.
113
 Id. at para. 52.
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governed by the law of another Member State. This was because the Eleventh Directive,114 
which subjects branches to disclosure requirements, pre-empted the field.115 
The Court, however, did consider the WFBV provisions that did not fall within the scope 
of the Eleventh Directive.116 These were the minimum capital requirements rules.117 The 
Netherlands and Germany, inter alia, asserted that these WFBV provisions did not violate 
Articles 43 and 48.118 First, they argued that the WFBV dealt neither with company formation 
nor registration and thus did not implement the freedom of establishment.119 Rather, they 
maintained that the WFBV merely imposed additional obligations that related to a company’s 
“business activities and the running of the company. . . .”120 As such, the provisions fell outside 
of the scope of Centros, which had distinguished “rules governing the formation of 
companies”121 from “rules concerning the carrying on of certain trades, professions or 
businesses.”122 
Second, they stated that Daily Mail supported their position.123 They interpreted Daily 
Mail to stand for the proposition that Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty did not restrict a host 
Member State’s power to “determine the relevant factor connecting a company to their national 
114
 11th Council Directive 89/666 Concerning Disclosure Requirements in respect of Branches opened in 
a Member State by Certain Types of Company Governed by the Law of Another State, Dec. 21, 1989, 
O.J. (L 395/36).  See VANESSA EDWARDS, EC COMPANY LAW 212-218 (F.G. Jacobs ed., 1999) 
(providing an overview of the scope and major issues relating to the Eleventh Directive, which subjects 
branches to certain disclosure requirements).
115
 Inspire Art at paras. 55, 69 (“It follows that, without affecting the information obligations imposed on 
branches under social or tax law, or in the field of statistics, harmonization of the disclosure to be made 
by branches, as brought about by the Eleventh Directive, is exhaustive. . . .”).
116
 Id. at para. 73.
117
 Id.
118
 Id. at para. 74.
119
 Id. at para. 75.
120
 Id. at para. 81.
121
 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459, I-1493.
122
 Inspire Art at para. 76.
123
 Id. at para. 83.
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legal order.”124 This echoed the aforementioned argument in Uberseering that a Member State 
could determine when it conferred “legal personality”125 on a company. They also asserted that 
they were free to apply national law as the rules relating to freedom of establishment had not led 
to harmonization.126 
Third, Germany and Austria argued that Articles 43 and 48 were not designed to enable 
the aforementioned undertakings of “brass-plate companies.”127 They asserted that formally 
foreign companies should fall outside of the freedom of establishment because they were 
primary establishments.128 This assertion went further than Denmark’s assertion in Centros, 
which had then confined itself to contending that a “principal establishment”129 fell outside of the 
right to set up “agencies, branches or subsidiaries,” rather than that there was no primary
establishment right under the freedom of establishment.
Fourth, the Netherlands and Germany, inter alia, asserted the abusive or fraudulent 
improper circumvention justification measure that Centros implied was allowed under the 
freedom of establishment.130 They broadly interpreted the holding in Centros, which did not 
allow a host Member State to refuse registration to a company having legal personality under 
another home Member State, to not apply. This was because the host Member State, unlike in 
124
 Id.
125
 For a discussion of the relationship between a Member State conferring legal personality on a 
company and its ability to restrict a company without violating the freedom of establishment, see supra
Sections 2.1.1, 2.3.1.
126
 Inspire Art at para. 102.
127
 Id. at para. 84.
128
 Id. at para. 85.
129
 See Ebke, supra note 28, at 629 (noting a debate that existed as to whether primary establishment was 
encompassed by principal establishment at the time of Centros).
130
 See Inspire Art at para. 86; Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 
E.C.R. I-1459, I-1496.
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Centros, did not refuse to register or recognize a company, but only provided for limited 
“preventive measures and penalties.”131 
The Court rejected the host Member States’ first argument that the WFBV merely dealt 
with the carrying on of business and did thus not violate the freedom of establishment. It 
concluded that the WFBV, even though it dealt with the day-to-day operations of existing 
companies, adversely impacted the formation of companies to the extent that formally foreign 
companies like Inspire Art carried on their activities “exclusively, or almost exclusively, in the 
Netherlands.132 
It then rejected their argument that Daily Mail permitted Member States to assert legal 
personality over companies, or to determine the connecting factor to national origin. It stated:
[U]nlike the case at issue in the main proceedings, Daily Mail and General Trust
concerned relations between a company and the Member State under the laws of 
which it had been incorporated in a situation where the company wished to 
transfer its actual centre of administration to another Member State whilst 
retaining its legal personality in the State of incorporation.133 
Finally, based on the above, the Court concluded that the WFBV restricted freedom of 
establishment under Articles 43 and 48.134 It then turned to the question of justification for the 
minimum capital and directors’ liability provisions contained within the WFBV.
The Netherlands argued that the provisions regarding the paying-up and maintenance of 
minimum capital were justified by both Article 46135 and by overriding reasons relating to the 
131
 Inspire Art at para. 88.
132
 Id. at paras. 100-01.
133
 Id. at para. 103.
134
 Id. at para. 104.
135
 Article 46 reads in relevant part:
The provisions of this chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not 
prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, 
public security or public health.
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public interest.136 It asserted that they protected creditors and others against the risk of 
fraudulent insolvency.137 In addition, it argued that the directors’ liability provisions were 
justified by the fact that Member States, absent harmonization, had broad discretion in applying 
penalties for non-compliance of national law.138 They also argued that they were justified 
because directors were responsible for the proper conduct of company matters.139 
The Court summarily dismissed any justifications under Article 46.140 It classified the 
justifications as “aims of protecting creditors, combating improper recourse to freedom of 
establishment, and protecting both effective tax inspections and fairness in business 
dealings. . . .”141 These had to be evaluated on the basis of overriding reasons.142 
Second, it considered the above justifications. Protecting creditors failed because 
creditors were already put on notice that they were dealing with U.K. companies.143 Combating 
improper recourse to freedom of establishment failed as Centros had affirmed that a company 
not conducting any business in the Member State of its formation could circumvent a host 
EC TREATY, supra note 13, at art. 46.
136
 Inspire Art at para. 108.
137
 Id. at para. 110.
138
 Id. at para. 111.
139
 Id. at para. 112.
140
 Id. at para. 131.
141
 Id. at para. 132.
142
 The court earlier noted that the criteria for evaluating justifications on the basis of overriding reasons:
[T]hey must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by 
imperative requirements in the public interest; they must be suitable for securing the 
attainment of the objective which they pursue, and they must not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to attain it. . . .
Id. at para. 133
143
 Id. at para. 135.
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Member State’s national law to take advantage of more relaxed rules.144 The Court in Centros
had thus already held that circumvention did not constitute abuse or fraud.145 
However, the Court took an ambiguous position with regard to fairness in business 
dealings and the efficiency of tax inspections. It implied, without stating anything affirmatively, 
that these might be justifications, but dismissed them in the absence of evidence as to “efficacy, 
proportionality and non-discrimination.”146 
Finally, the Court never considered the independent legality of the directors’ liability 
provisions. Since the minimum capital provisions were incompatible with the freedom of 
establishment, the Court held that its penalties were as well.147 Thus, it remained unclear 
whether director liability could be used as a means to discourage circumvention in a proper 
context.
2.4.1. Analysis and Exploration of Inspire Art
Some lawyers in the EC have hailed this case as opening the path to a competition of 
jurisdictions.148 However, in many respects, there is nothing particularly new or significant at 
work in this decision. First, Uberseering would seem to have clearly already refuted the 
144
 Id. at para. 137-139.
145
 See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459, I-1493 
(holding that circumvention by itself was not an abuse of the freedom of establishment).
146
 Inspire Art at para. 140.
147
 Id. at para. 141.
148
 Matthias Hirschman and Dirk Ellerman, two practitioners in the EC at the law firm Lovells, wrote: xx 
In its Inspire Art decision of 30 September 2003, it held that a corporate entity validly established in one 
member state may transfer its administrative seat to another member state without having to comply with 
the second member state’s stricter corporate legislation.  The decision is expected to increase competition 
between legal types of company [sic.] throughout Europe and puts further strain on the minimum 
capitalisation and strict capital maintenance rules of German company law. xx Matthias Hirschman and 
Dirk Ellerkman, Inspire Art: End of German GmbH? (2003) , at
http://www.practicallaw.com/scripts/article.asp?Article_ID=33973.
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Member States’ primary establishment149 argument. At the same time, Inspire Art is the first 
case where the Court explicitly recognized that the freedom of establishment entailed a right of 
primary establishment.
Second, the Court refuted Germany’s and Denmark’s argument that a Member State 
could assert legal personality over a company. Nothing is factually new in this respect. Rather, 
it appears as if certain Member States merely attempted to bypass Uberseering’s decision that a 
Member State could not determine legal personality when a company was already a creature of 
another Member State by shifting terms to the “connecting factor” language left outstanding 
from Daily Mail.
In addition, the company’s transfer was more legitimate in this case than in Uberseering, 
where Germany had found transfer on the mere basis of share acquisition. However, 
Uberseering never rested on whether there was an actual transfer.150 It held that even if there 
had been a transfer, Daily Mail was essentially limited to the emigration context. Thus, the 
connecting factor argument was clearly stale from the outset.
The argument that national anti-circumvention measures could be applied under the 
abuse exception to freedom of establishment also is not novel. Centros previously held that a 
company not having carried on any business in the Member State under whose law it was formed 
that intended to circumvent a host Member State’s national law did not per se fall within the 
scope of the abuse exception.151 
149
 Even Daily Mail had implied that transferring the central administration to a non-set state was a 
protected form of establishment. After  Uberseering, where the “transfer” was to a seat state, the primary 
establishment argument is extremely weak.
150
 See supra note 98 (stating that the Court refused to base its holding on a transfer situation).
151
 See supra text accompanying note 51 (noting that the Centros Court found that circumvention by itself 
was consistent with the freedom of establishment).
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However, Germany’s and Denmark’s argument did present one important issue. Centros
had left open the possibility that the abuse exception to freedom of establishment would apply 
when carrying on trades, professions or businesses as opposed to the company registration 
scenario.152 
The Netherlands in Inspire Art tried to capitalize on this opening to argue that Inspire 
Art’s failure to comply with the WFBV was abusive because the WFBV didn’t concern the
registration scenario, but only related to carrying on trades, professions or businesses as the
WFBV never required registration or refused recognition. Since the penalty for noncompliance 
was merely joint and several director liability, with the company itself not incurring any penalty, 
the Netherlands could strongly argue that the WFBV in this respect merely imposed additional 
“administrative” obligations.153 This was clearly a very strong argument from a technical point 
of view, especially since the Court in Centros had suggested that less restrictive measures than 
denial of registration would be permitted in order to allow creditors to obtain the necessary 
guarantees.154 The Inspire Art decision, which rejected the creditor argument, thus reduced the 
protecting creditor justification to meaninglessness, since creditors would be considered 
protected when they were merely put on notice that they were dealing with U.K. companies.155 
If the argument had succeeded, the impact with regard to jurisdictional competition in the 
EU would have surely been severe. Before analyzing the precise implications of this argument, 
it is worthwhile to note that the goal of the anti-competition Member States following Centros
152
 See supra text accompanying note 52 (explaining that the Centros Court had hinted at a different 
outcome should restrictions relate to the carrying on of trades, professions or businesses).
153
 Inspire Art at para. 99.
154
 See supra text accompanying note 57 (discussing potential justifications to which the Centros Court 
alluded).
155
 See supra text accompanying note 143 (construing the less restrictive justification of protecting 
creditors that the Court had potentially acknowledged in Centros).
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was to find a way of preventing state of incorporation Member States with relaxed laws from 
exporting their rules.
Uberseering was the first attempt. Rather than run head on into existing circumvention 
jurisprudence, the anti-competition Member States were forced to run backwards to Daily Mail
in an attempt to capitalize on the more fundamental tension between national company law and 
freedom of establishment. This was staged through the technicalities of the real seat doctrine.
After the effort to use Daily Mail failed, the anti-competition Member States were 
effectively pinned against the wall. Their only judicial recourse to the problem was to take the 
dangerous path toward the quintessence of Centros itself.  If they succeeded, Centros and 
jurisdictional competition would be severely crippled. Inspire Art was this attempt.
If these Member States had prevailed, it would have meant that minimum capital 
requirements fell within the scope of carrying on trades, professions or businesses when the 
penalty for non-compliance was director liability, provided that there was no refusal of 
recognition or registration. This, in turn, would have meant namely two things.
First, it virtually would have ensured that co-determination requirements156 could be 
required with a similar penalty. This is because co-determination157 more clearly would fall 
within the scope of carrying on trades, professions or businesses, since it relates to day-to-day 
employee participation. Second, more importantly, it would have generally tended to allow 
Member States to export stricter national law rules.
156
 For a discussion of a German co-determination law, see Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Guarantees 
of Social Welfare in the Process of German Unification, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 307 (1999) (explaining 
that codetermination grants employees significant representation on boards of major companies); see
LOMBARDO, supra note 8, at 40 (noting that co-determination differs significantly among European states 
as some workers enjoy protection in the context of company law instead of labor law).
157
 See Lombardo, supra note 8, at 129-33 (describing the evolution of co-determination following the 
Second World War).
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In this respect, there were two possible scenarios. To illustrate this, consider the 
minimum capital requirements. First, a formally foreign company could comply. To do so, it 
would have to maintain the requisite level of minimum capital in the Member State where it 
incorporated to take advantage of more relaxed legislation. This would have had the effect not 
only of imposing the stricter rule on the company when it does business in the host Member 
State, as the Centros requirement would have done, but in the home Member State of 
incorporation as well.158 As a result, strict law would in certain issues get exported when 
companies sought to circumvent other issues. This would have resulted in a two-way 
exportation, which the real seat Member States might have found marginally equitable.
Second, a formally foreign company could choose not to comply. In this case, directors 
would face liability. Although the company would then take advantage of the upside of the 
relaxed legislation, its directors would face the risk. Since directors would tend not to want 
personal downside for the company’s upside, they would be less likely to choose non-
compliance. As a result, there would be no incentive to form formally foreign companies for the 
purposes of circumvention.
If they did choose non-compliance, companies could attempt to offset director risk. This 
could be accomplished namely through option compensation or indemnification. These 
mechanisms might, however, have been met with substantial opposition on the part of the anti-
competition Member States. Since the justification for interfering with freedom of establishment 
would be fraud in this scenario, it seems unlikely that their opposition would prevail as offsetting 
director risk would not decrease creditor payment. Moreover, since companies are anyhow 
158
 Of course, in the case of purely intrastate companies, this scenario would have had no import.  
Although this would not have affected purely intrastate companies, most multi-national companies would 
have been impacted, thereby at least tending to substantially export strict law.
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liable, it is not clear that they would incur significantly greater risk. This might have led to a 
situation where anti-competition Member States ensured that creditors got paid, while companies 
still could take advantage of more relaxed rules.159 However, the increased agency costs would 
still tend to maintain the status quo.
It is anybody’s guess which of these two scenarios would have obtained. At a minimum, 
this would have maintained the status quo, or a compromise situation. If fully successful, anti-
competition Member States would have sometimes exported160 strict rules throughout the EC. In 
this respect, the potential outcomes were very similar to those in Uberseering.
One impact then of the Court’s decision in Inspire Art is that it again avoided a possible 
exporting of strict law, or at a minimum, avoided retaining the status quo. This is particularly 
significant because the anti-competition Member States may have finally exhausted their roads 
for accomplishing either of these purposes, at least as far as current jurisprudential doctrine is 
concerned. This is visually illustrated below.
159
 This outcome would clearly have been much less effective for anti-competition Member States in co-
determination, where protection of creditors is not at stake.  As such, it would have only partially met 
their expectations.  On the other hand, they could have more easily opposed option compensation and 
indemnification on this ground.  This would have led toward retaining the status quo.
160
 Most likely, it would not have exported strict rules very often as Member States would have no 
incentive to incorporate in one Member State only to transfer central administration to another Member 
State.
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2.4.2. The Aftermath of Inspire Art: Jurisdictional Competition in the EC?
Despite the lack of major published analyses, many practitioners have therefore assumed 
that Inspire Art will definitely open the road to jurisdictional competition in Europe.161 This is 
probably true, at least, with regard to allowing the possibility of competition over minimum 
capital requirements in the case of new incorporations. This is so for two reasons.
First, two major cases are now on point holding that neither Daily Mail’s legal 
personality circumstance nor the freedom of establishment abuse exception (even when the 
circumvention measure appears to relate to the carrying on of trades, professions or businesses) 
allow anti-circumvention measures in minimum capital requirements cases in immigrations. 
Thus, anti- competition Member States in this regard have come close to running out of doctrinal 
options.
161
 See, e.g., Matthias Hirschman and Dirk Ellerkman, Inspire Art: End of German GmbH? (2003) 
(suggesting that Inspire Art is expected to lead to jurisdictional competition), at
http://www.practicallaw.com/scripts/article.asp?Article_ID=70774.
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Second, the Court appears to have held in Inspire Art that requirements “mandatorily”162 
applied to formally foreign companies that have the “effect of impeding the exercise by those 
companies of the freedom of establishment”163 fall within the scope of registration requirements, 
not within carrying on trades, professions or businesses. This tautologically means that 
minimum capital requirements fall within the registration requirements’ scope.
However, Centros and Uberseering merely construe one area of the controversy relating 
to relaxed rules. Most major areas, such as co-determination,164 have yet to be construed. 
Clearly, the anti-competition Member States after beginning the fight in the area of minimum 
capital in Centros were not going to fight off Centros by putting co-determination at stake. A 
victory in minimum capital requirements in Inspire Art would have effectively protected co-
determination whereas a defeat would not have explicitly destroyed it.
The anti-competition Member States in Inspire Art clearly suffered a very serious defeat. 
One of the major issues in the jurisdictional competition is now lost to these Member States.
However, they have cleverly and craftily proceeded in their quest thus far, slowly yielding one 
piece at a time.
In the hypothetical co-determination situation, one possibility would be a challenge based 
on Daily Mail’s notion that a Member State can determine whether companies possess legal 
162
 Inspire Art at para. 100.
163
 Id. at para. 101.
164
 See Gilson, supra note 1, at 353 (presenting a theoretical discussion regarding the future of co-
determination).  Part of why co-determination has not yet been construed is because the application of co-
determination rules to a branch of a foreign company is contrary to German law.  In addition, 
codetermination is currently linked to the company statute itself.  See Wymeersch, Centros, supra note 
52, at 11 (stating that Germany could alternatively apply a comparable measure at the branch level).  
However, this does not mean that Germany would not in the future try to change the structure of co-
determination, particularly as it can clearly no longer after Uberseering require incorporation of a 
company’s central administration in its state.
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personality under its national law. This would clearly fail after Uberseering, which was not 
based in minimum capital and which anyhow very firmly limited the use of Daily Mail.
The other possibility would be to lodge an abuse exception challenge under Centros. 
This clearly has a better chance of success than the Daily Mail challenge. However, the Court in 
Inspire Art gave some indications that such a challenge would fail in the case of co-
determination. This is because a national law that seemed to prima facie be concerned with the 
carrying on of trades, professions or businesses was held to anyhow restrict freedom of 
establishment because it was mandatorily applied, and its effect was to harm formation of 
companies.165 
On the other hand, all co-determination requirements that didn’t refuse registration or 
recognition to companies would seem to be concerned with the carrying on of trades, professions
or businesses. This is because co-determination applies in the day-to-day life of workers in 
companies. As such, it is more properly within the scope of the “carrying on” exception.
It is unclear how the Court would resolve this conflict. The new “effects” doctrine 
suggests that it would be resolved against the anti-competition Member States. Under Inspire 
Art, it appears that mandatory requirements that effect formation simply do not fall within the 
scope of “carrying on.” On the other hand, the Court might logically limit this doctrine as it 
previously limited Daily Mail.
This could be done by simply deciding that mandatory codetermination requirements, 
absent registration requirements or denial of recognition, do not per se affect company 
formation. Certainly, there is a case to be made that they don’t impact initial capital investment 
165
 See Inspire Art at paras. 100-01 (“The effect of the WFBV is, in fact, that the Netherlands company 
law rules on minimum capital and directors’ liability are applied mandatorily to foreign companies such 
as Inspire Art when they carry on their activities exclusively, or almost exclusively, in the Netherlands.”).
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to the same degree. Such a decision cannot be ruled out as co-determination requirements seem 
to philosophically fit more properly in the “carrying on” exception that the Court might stretch in 
this direction. This would be especially true if it felt that labor were a more important 
“stakeholder”166 interest than creditors.
If it did so, limiting the effects doctrine in some way or other would have interesting 
effects on jurisdictional competition. Once again, in a WFBV-like scenario, the formally foreign 
company could choose to comply with the requirement. A company that complied would have 
to adopt co-determination in the Member State under whose law it was formed. This would 
actually produce partial laxity, in addition to an exportation of certain strict laws, since 
companies would have some incentive to actually incorporate in order to take advantage of 
favorable minimum capital requirements. Once again, the strict Member States would have 
likely found this situation marginally equitable.
On the other hand, a company could also not comply with the co-determination 
requirement. In this event, the anti-competition Member State would seek director liability. The 
company would again try to counter by providing indemnification. However, indemnification 
would possibly fail in this scenario as Member States could employ consistent arguments to 
block it.
166
 See Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 97 (2002) (“This term loosely refers to all parties with a stake in the firm who are not 
shareholders and includes investors, employees, creditors, and suppliers.”); THE CORPORATION AND ITS 
STAKEHOLDERS: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS (Max Clarkson ed., 1998) (presenting 
collected essays on stakeholder theory); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Corporate Governance, Culture and 
Convergence: Corporations American Style or With a European Touch?, 9 NAFTA L & BUS. AM. 33, 46 
(2003) (noting that stakeholder theory is recognized in Europe, excepting the U.K.); LOMBARDO, supra
note 8, at 79 (noting that stakeholder theory in strong stakeholder states even takes into account the 
interest of the State).
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Assuming that they could not block it or that option compensation could be sufficiently 
employed to offset director risk, non-compliance may obtain. If the penalty imposed were 
director liability, as in Inspire Art, anti-competition Member States might fail to force companies 
to adopt co-determination requirements. However, non-compliance would obtain only at the 
price of increased agency costs. These costs could very well countervail any resultant benefit 
from relaxed law.
If the Court limits the effects doctrine at co-determination, a full race for laxity would 
thus not ensue, since compliance would result in a two-way exporting of law, while non-
compliance would likely result in no exporting of law. This is visually illustrated below.
3. FACTORS LIMITING JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION
Although Member States with strict rules Clearly have no power to restrict newly formed 
companies from becoming formed under the law of a Member State with relaxed rules and 
exporting those rules, a full jurisdictional competition scenario would require that long 
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established companies in the strict Member States also have the possibility of changing 
jurisdictions.167 
Company law rules regarding dissolution might effectively prevent a company’s ability 
to change jurisdictions. One possibility for restricting emigration establishments is for strict 
Member States to impose dissolution on the emigrating company. A strict Member State would 
thus withdraw its legal personality where a company formed under its laws wished to 
emigrate.168 Existing companies would have to either dissolve and reincorporate at a 
prohibitively high cost or not establish branches. This is so for the following reasons.
Dissolutions are not financially feasible for companies. First, Ronald Gilson notes that 
under Germany’s real seat law, a company’s changing of jurisdiction of incorporation is treated
as liquidation and results in corporate level capital gains tax on the appreciation in assets. Thus, 
for large corporations, the added value of relaxed law in another Member State would most 
likely not be worth the tax cost.169 In addition, three Danish scholars point out:
A change of nationality requiring dissolution in the state of origin, whereby assets 
are transferred to the shareholders, and re-incorporation in the receiving state, 
involving a transfer of assets to the newly formed company, is costly and not a 
feasible method. The company law rules will treat it as a different company, and 
therefore, contracts, loans, etc. cannot be assigned to the new company without 
the consent of the creditors, or contracting parties.170 
As a result, companies who were formed under the laws of a strict Member State could 
not change their jurisdiction. First, this could prevent jurisdictional competition in the case of 
167
 See Wymeersch, Transfer of the Seat, supra note 96, at 9 (noting that cross-border mergers are an 
effective tool, without a comparable European instrument, for accomplishing jurisdictional transfers in the 
United States).
168
 See id. at 17 (asserting that so restricting emigration could lead to an immigration jurisprudence that 
was purposeless).
169
 Gilson, supra note 1, at 356.
170
 Mette Neville, Niels Winther-Sorensen et al., Free Movement of Companies under Company Law, Tax 
Law, and EU Law, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF COMPANIES AND COMPANY LAWS 197 (Mette 
Neville & Karsten Engsig Sorensen eds., 2001) [hereinafter Neville et al., Free Movement].
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new companies as the Centros connecting factor requires that a company is duly formed in the 
home Member State. It is doubtful that all Member States would restrict emigration. 
Presumably, at least one Member State would seek to become the Delaware of Europe.171 
More likely, the Daily Mail emigration scenario would bar only existing companies from 
exiting. Wymeersch, however, questions whether Daily Mail would ever extend beyond the tax 
context.172 If it did not extend beyond the tax context, then it might not bar existing companies. 
Such an argument fails for two reasons.
First, not allowing an antecedent home Member State to deny legal personality would run 
against Uberseering, which based its holding on the fact that the German rule would violate the 
company’s Dutch legal personality.173 
Second, as things stand, companies would have to dissolve and reincorporate to take 
advantage of a host Member State’s law. This strategy, as discussed above, is not economically 
viable. As a result, existing companies would not change their home jurisdictions.
They may nevertheless have an incentive to anyhow export law, perhaps by transferring 
their seat to take advantage of a more relaxed tax regime,174 but this would not lead to a true 
jurisdictional competition as these companies could not effectively choose what state’s law they 
were exporting. Thus, whether or not a Member State requires dissolution after primary
171
 But see infra text accompanying notes 177-79 (noting that no Member State would have a similar 
financial incentive).
172
 See Wymeersch, Transfer of the Seat, supra note 96, at 17 (expressing a concern that withdrawing 
legal personality would undercut the purposes of immigration that the Court had upheld).
173
 See supra Section 2.3 (discussing issues surrounding a real seat Member State’s potential automatic 
conferral of legal personality on companies that transfer their seat that occurred in Uberseering).
174
 See Neville et al., Free Movement, supra note 170, at 200-212, 224-226 (providing a detailed 
discussion why a company could change, at least to some extent, the tax regime to which it was subject 
without changing its company law jurisdiction).
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establishment in emigration, a jurisdictional competition will not ensue for already existing 
companies.
In the tax context, however, there is a greater possibility that existing companies in strict 
Member States could jurisdictionally shop. This is because in some cases transferring effective 
management, without dissolution, is enough to ensure that a company is no longer fully under 
the tax regime of its state of origin.175 However, Daily Mail would allow the Member State of 
origin to impose taxation in this event.176 Such taxation may be enough to prevent well 
established companies from jurisdictionally shopping for tax law.
If Wymeersch is incorrect, the decisions in Centros, Uberseering, and Inspire Art suggest 
a different strategy for Member States seeking to limit the possibility of jurisdictional 
competition. Before considering such a strategy, one most note two points.
First, these cases require formation “in accordance with the legislation of a Member 
State.”177 Second, a Member State’s legal personality that is first in time (the home state) should 
not be interfered with except by the Member State under whose law that company was formed:
[Uberseering’s] very existence is inseparable from its status as a company 
incorporated under Netherlands law since, as the Court has observed, a company 
exists only by virtue of the national legislation which determines its incorporation 
and functioning. The requirement of reincorporation of the same company in 
Germany is therefore tantamount to outright negation of freedom of 
establishment.178 
A strategy in this regard, in the event that tax consequences were insufficient to control 
reincorporation, would be for strict Member States to alter their legislation to incorporate 
permanence into the attributes of their national companies so as to prevent existing companies 
175
 Id. at 224.
176
 See id. (stating that such a view is a basic assumption of Daily Mail).
177
 Inspire Art at para. 101.
178
 Case C-208/00, Uberseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 
2002 E.C.R. I-09919, at para. 81.
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from terminating their personality.179 Such a modification would ensure that existing companies 
duly formed in strict real seat Member States are always subject to the strict laws.
If this modification happened, strict real seat Member States as well as state of 
incorporation Member States could stop companies from dissolving and reincorporating in more 
relaxed Member States. The question is whether they could get away with it, or whether the 
E.C.J. would extend Uberseering to decide that a primary establishment in another Member State 
would offend the legal personality of the Member State under whose law a company was formed 
even when that company wanted to wrap up its affairs?180  If a company is really a creature of 
national legislation, then why couldn’t a Member State under whose law a company was formed 
deny dissolution?
In any event, the following are extremely likely: first, the freedom of establishment 
jurisprudence will lead to at least a possibility of partial jurisdictional competition181 in the case 
of new companies; second, the competition will be averted in the case of existing companies.182 
179
 See Wyrneersch, Transfer of the Seat, supra note 96, at 18 (stating that it is not clear “[w]hether [Daily 
Mail] may lead to fully denying companies the right to emigrate, or merely allows member states to 
impose certain conditions. . . .”).  But cf. Neville et al., Free Movement, supra note 170, at 224-225 
(taking the view that even tax rights would not be unfettered and would be subject to the proportionality 
principle).
180
 Clearly, the E.C.J. didn’t contemplate this situation, since it stated in Daily Mail that “all the systems 
permit the winding-up of a company in one Member State and its reincorporation in another.”  Case C-
81/87, Regina v. HM Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue ex parte Daily Mail and General 
Trust plc, 1988 E.C.R. 5483, 5510.
181
 Harmonization through 44(2)(g) of the EC Treaty could potentially prevent a jurisdictional 
competition.  44(2) (g) provides in pertinent part:
The Council and the Commission shall carry out the duties devolving upon them under 
the preceding provisions, in particular:  . . . by coordinating to the necessary extent the 
safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required 
by Member States of companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of 
Article [48] with a view to making such safeguards equivalent through the Community.
EC TREATY, supra note 13, at art. 48.
See also LOMBARDO, supra note 8, at 43 (explaining that harmonization was susceptible to an 
alternative construction that would not allow free establishment).  For an evaluation of harmonization, see 
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4. JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION-INCENTIVE AND ASSESSMENT
The above discussion has so far mainly gone to the question of the possibility of a 
jurisdictional competition. However, this does not address whether Member States would 
actually have an incentive to compete, or whether jurisdictional competition in the case of newly 
formed companies would be positive. In order to ascertain the answer to these questions, this 
Comment will take a brief look at the incentives for jurisdictional competition in the United 
States, and whether these incentives have positively affected U.S. corporate law. Finally, we 
will consider what implications these answers have for the EC.
4.1. The U.S. Example
A significant incentive for Delaware to be seriously interested in attracting incorporations 
is the franchise fee. “That this can be a considerable source of revenue may be illustrated by the 
Wymeersch, Centros, supra note 52, at 19 (noting that “harmonization has sometimes been used to 
achieve this type of anti-competitive conduct” as well as that harmonization has a poor record and would 
be unlikely to succeed); LOMBARDO, supra note 8, at 66 (noting that harmonization may have 
disadvantages in terms of regulatory failure, regulatory capture and innovative ability as well as 
advantages by achieving economies of scale).  But cf. Christian Kersting, Corporate Choice of Law — A 
Comparison of the United States and European Systems and a Proposal for a European Directive, 28 
BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1 (2002) (providing a very detailed account of how specifically harmonization 
might be achieved); LOMBARDO, supra note 8, at 47-54 (explaining and discussing nine directives and 
two regulations that have been successfully adopted with respect to company law harmonization).
182
 The jurisdictional competition for reincorporation could change if the Fourteenth Company Law 
Directive passes.  This would allow “companies to change their [nationality] without having to be 
dissolved in the state of origin and re-incorporated in the receiving state.”  Neville et al., Free Movement, 
supra note 170, at 227.
It could also change with the passage of the Tenth Directive on cross-border mergers.  See
Birkmose, supra note 10, at 255 (noting that this directive would make mergers between companies from 
several different states possible); see Edwards, supra note 114, at 391-393 (explaining that the Tenth 
Directive has not passed due to a controversial article that allows Member States to not apply workers’ 
participation rules when an undertaking would result in not meeting the conditions required for being a 
representative in an undertaking’s organs).
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fact that, in 1998, franchise tax revenue in Delaware amounted to $400m, corresponding to more 
than 19% of Delaware’s total tax receipts.”183 
In order to get franchise fees, Delaware has led a race in the United States that has ended 
in increasingly relaxed corporate regulation. “Through countless adaptations of company laws, 
the states have tried to make the law so attractive for the companies that they choose to 
incorporate in their jurisdictions.”184 These adaptations have led to the seminal scholarly debate 
in U.S. corporate law as to whether Delaware has led corporate law in the United States toward a 
race to the top, or toward a race to the bottom.185 This debate hinges on whether the relaxed 
regulation benefits management at the expense of shareholders or whether it optimizes 
shareholder investments.186 
The race to the top argument has become dominant in U.S. corporate law scholarship.187 
Its proponents argue that company directors will choose to reincorporate in a state whose 
183
 Birkmose, supra note 10, at 246 (“see 
www.state.de.us/finance/publications/fiscalnotebook/taxes.pdf”).
184
 Id. at 245.
185
 For the origins of the debate, see W.L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon 
Delaware, 88 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (noting jurisdictional competition leads to a race to the bottom); R. 
Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.L. STUD. 251 (1979) 
(noting jurisdictional competition leads to a race to the top); Roberta Romano, The Genius of American 
Corporate Law (1993) (describing the market for corporations and praising the genius of jurisdictional 
competition); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 225 (1985) (documenting the importance of the franchise fee in American jurisdictional 
competition theory); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest — Group Theory of 
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987) (showing the application of interest-group theory 
on the race to the top or race to the bottom debate); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the 
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437 
(1992) (presenting an empirical analysis of the dynamics and effects of state competition).
186
 See Birkmose, supra note 10, at 246-47 (“[T]his disagreement centres on whether the fact that the 
individual states periodically adapt their law to the ‘needs’ of the companies results in legislation enabling 
companies to optimize shareholder investments . . . or whether the result is legislation that favours 
company management. . . .”).
187
 In Europe, however, race to the top arguments have not historically been dominant.  See Clive M. 
Schmitthoff, The Future of the European Company Law, in THE HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN 
COMPANY LAW (Schmitthoff ed., 1973) (providing an example of the traditional European view on 
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company law will maximize values for both shareholders and directors because their freedom is 
limited by market forces.188 As a result, directors will maximize shareholder earnings in order to 
keep their positions.189 The other major disciplining force is the fact that shareholders can exert 
a disciplinary effect on directors by withdrawing their investments.190 
4.2. Existing and Newly Formed Companies in the E.C.
Birkmose asserts that the EC will not have any incentive to race toward laxity for two 
reasons. First, the same fiscal incentives do not exist for EC Member States.191 There is no 
equivalent to the franchise tax and the potential revenues from company income tax “will usually 
be regarded as being resident in the state in which the company has its seat of management
according to the provisions of a double taxation convention;192 accordingly, that State generally 
has the right to tax the company’ s income.”193 
This argument assumes that Member States would not race, but for an immediate fiscal 
tax incentive. However, it could also be argued that “countries have sought to improve their 
chances for corporate success by implementing the best practices from around the world. The 
competition among corporations in product, labor, and capital markets is thought of as being 
jurisdictional competition); Stefan Grundman, Regulatory Competition in European Company Law —
Some Different Genius?, in CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE AGE OF THE EURO 561 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 
2002) (noting that many authors in Europe still regard jurisdictional competition as both unadvisable and 
not transposable).  Cf. supra text accompanying notes 166, 195 (discussing the stakeholder theory, which 
is currently dominant in the EC).
188
 See Birkmose, supra note 10, at 249 (noting that the most important of these disciplining forces is the 
market for corporate control and the risk of hostile takeover).
189
 See id.
190
 See id. at 250 (stat that shareholders might decide to re-invest their money in a state with more 
efficient legislation).
191
 See id. at 265 (explaining that fiscal factors have been given priority by U.S. states).
192
 See Neville et al., Free Movement, supra note 170, at 200-226 (providing a detailed discussion of the 
double taxation convention).
193
 Birkmose, supra note 10, at 266.
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matched by competition among corporate governance models.”194 Thus, if racing is the most 
efficient system, efficiency itself would seem to create a sufficient incentive, particularly in a 
global world.
Second, Birkmose argues that even if the U.S. example of the race leads to legislation 
that maximizes shareholder wealth, “the objective of [EC] company law is not only to regulate 
the relations between the company and it shareholders but also between the company and its 
other stakeholders.”195 Since maximizing shareholder wealth is not the only goal of EC Member 
States, they will be less likely to race toward laxity even if Member States are really trying to 
come up with the most efficient system. Birkmose thus essentially argues that efficiency is 
normative, and that U.S. standards will not transpose on to European standards.
Third, Birkmose suggests that under prevailing European stakeholder normative 
standards, a race would not be efficient.  Although shareholders196 would undoubtedly be 
protected in a competition for new incorporations, other stakeholders (such as creditors and 
employees of a company) would potentially not be protected.197 In addition, he asserts that the 
relaxed regulation that resulted from attracting new incorporations would have a secondary effect 
on shareholders of existing companies.198 
194
 Garza, supra note 92, at 83.
195
 Birkmose, supra note 10, at 251.
196
 See id. at 252 (stating that shareholders would be protected as they would “know under which 
conditions the company is to be operated and thus the risks involved at the time they subscribe for the 
shares.”).
197
 Id.
198
 See id. (“This danger is present because the existing companies in a Member State are subject to the 
same law as the new companies, and if the rules are made more lenient in order to attract new companies, 
these lenient rules will also become applicable to the existing companies.”).  Such an argument actually 
understates the potential secondary effect.  Newly formed companies in relaxed states could export their 
law to strict Member States, while existing companies in strict Member States would be subject to strict 
rules.
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This creates two questions: 1) would the secondary effect on existing companies give
rise to investment inefficiency for shareholders; 2) even if there is no inefficiency for
shareholders, would there anyhow be stakeholder inefficiency?199 
Newly incorporating companies may have very different interests from existing 
companies. In any one Member State, each company would seem to equally bear the costs of 
regulation. However, this is not accurate.
Certain newly formed companies can export law to other Members States. Existing 
companies will thus be at a competitive disadvantage if they are unable to change nationality. If 
the EC Member States decide to race, which they would do most likely out of a belief that it 
would at least maximize shareholder investment as the U.S. example200 strongly indicates, it is 
essential that the interests of shareholders in newly formed companies do not diverge too much 
from those of existing companies. If they diverge, then there will be no incentive to race.
5. AFTERWARD: THE EFFECT OF THE SE STATUTE
On October 8, 2004, the Statute of the European Corporation or Societas Europaea (“SE 
Statute”)201 became effective.202 The SE Statute203 allows companies to be established “in the 
199
 This question is so broad that it is difficult to conclusively address.  However, it does seem to risk 
losing features such as minimum capital requirements and co-determination, which relate to the interests 
of creditors and employees. xx If the E.C.J. rules that co-determination falls within the scope of “carrying 
on trades, professions or businesses,” see infra discussion accompanying note 41, the stakeholder 
efficiently problem might be somewhat mitigated.
200
 See id. at 246 (suggesting that in the U.S. example, uneven application would not be a concern as 
companies can freely reincorporate, without tax implications).
201
 See generally CARLA TAVARES DE COSTA, THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE (2003) (providing a 
broad overview of the SE statute regime).
202
 Friedrich Kubler, The Societas Europaea — Implementation and Perspectives 1 (2003) (unpublished 
symposium speech) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kubler].
203
 See Robert Drury, The European Private Company, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF COMPANIES 
AND COMPANY LAWS 57 (Mette Neville & Karsten Engsig Sorensen eds., 2001) (noting some basic 
features of the SE such as limited liability, close company form, legal personality from the moment of 
registration, and real seat theory).
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form of a European public limited-liability company. . . .”204 In addition, the SE Statute is 
relevant to a number of aforementioned important controversial issues. Among these issues are 
co-determination, minimum capital requirements, and the real seat theory.
The SE Statute deals with co-determination by requiring companies to “retain or adopt 
the codetermination regime of the participating companies which gives the highest degree of 
participation to the workers.”205 This means that SEs with establishments in multiple Member 
States will have to adopt the laws of strict Member States such as Germany in this regard.206 
The SE statute deals with minimum capital requirements primarily through Article 4. 
Article 4207 requires subscribed capital in excess of 120,000 Euro and allows a Member State to 
impose greater capital requirements on companies carrying on certain types of activities with 
registered offices in its Member State. This figure is substantially in excess of the minimum 
capital requirements of typical national companies.208 
Articles 7 and 64 of the SE statute deal with the real seat theory by “result[ing] in the 
conclusion that SEs must have their real seat and seat of incorporation in the same state. . . .”209 
204
 Council Regulation 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European company, art. 1, 2001 O.J. L-294 
[hereinafter SE Statute].
205
 Kubler, supra note 202, at 3.
206
 See Euro Rules for Companies, BELFAST NEWS LETTER, Dec. 20, 2003, at 22 (“The new laws could 
lead to workers’ representatives sitting on boards of major companies.”).
207
 SE STATUTE, supra note 204, arts. 4(2), (3)
208
 See Gilson, supra note 1, at 351 (noting that the Danish minimum capital requirements that Centros 
had sought to avoid were only $27,000, or 200,000 Danish Crowns); Walter D. Schwidetzky, A 
Comparison of Corporate Taxation in the United States and Germany: Different Ways Up the Mountain, 
28 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 217, 218 n.7 (2000) (noting that the relatively high German minimum 
capitals for an AG is 50,000 Euros) (citing § 7 AKTIENGESETZ).  An AG is a German stock 
corporation.  See William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 855, 866 (1995) (distinguishing the German GmbH, or limited liability company, from the 
German AG).
209
 The Jurisdiction competition and the European company, at
http://www.juridix.net/eu_soc/essay4_se.htm [hereinafter Jurisdiction Competition].
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These provisions appear to retreat from the national company law cases that had the effect of 
nearly abolishing the real seat doctrine.
The result of these provisions is that the new European company case law, which 
potentially lays the path to a limited jurisdictional competition, may find itself wholly eroded. 
This is because the SE statute threatens to impose uniformly strict standards210 on controversial 
areas that would mark a retreat from the position that will likely obtain as a result of Daily Mail, 
Centros, Uberseering and Inspire Art. However, a few different circumstances would likely 
prevent this result.
First, the SE statute in co-determination matters could be manipulated by an SE setting 
up a foreign subsidiary in another Member State and then merging into it. Article 66 of the SE 
statute, in turn, allows companies registered in one state, after a two year period, to transform 
itself into a public limited-liability company governed by national law.211 Thus, Professor 
Kubler notes:
[A] German corporation will be able to merge with a much smaller foreign 
company, which may be its subsidiary, into an SE under British, Dutch or 
Article 7 states:  “The registered office of an SE shall be located within the community, in the same 
Member State as its head office. . . .”  SE STATUTE, supra note 197, art. 7.
Article 64 states:
When an SE no longer complies with the requirement laid down in Article 7, the Member State in 
which the SE’s registered office is situated shall take appropriate measures to oblige the SE to 
regularize its position within a specified period either:  a) by re-established its head office in the 
Member State in which its registered office is situated, or b) by transferring the registered office 
by means of the procedure laid down in Article 8.
SE STATUTE, supra note 204, art. 64.
210
 This possibility marks a significant contrast from the popular viewpoints expressed in the European 
press.  See, e.g., John Plender, Continental Capitalism a la Carte, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2003, at 17 
(discussing fears that the SE STATUTE will lead to a la carte capitalism); Glass is 5% Full – Or 95%
Empty: European Company, BUS. LAW EUROPE, Sept. 30, 1997 (noting that the SE STATUTE will be an 
invitation to shop for accounting, auditing, and tax treatment).
211
 See Kubler, supra note 202, at 7 (pointing out a potential loophole in the statute).
53 of 57
Luxemburg law. But after two years . . . the company would no longer be 
determined by German law, but by the legal system of its registered office.212 
Although companies can currently after the expansive interpretation of the term ‘branch’ 
establish their seats in host Member States, this technique would allow existing companies to go 
one step further. They could export relaxed laws by changing a host Member State into a home 
Member State, without the expense of setting up a network of subsidiaries.213 This, of course, 
assumes that such a technique would not incur additional offsetting expenses. 
Whether such a strategy would incur tax consequences is not yet concrete.214 If the SE 
merger technique did incur tax consequences, then SEs would be unable to avoid strict 
requirements.  In addition, it is highly likely that company emigration will carry other costs in 
certain Member States, such as Germany.  These additional potential costs will likely include 
appraisal rights, even though such rights are considered to be at odds with the SE-Regulation.215 
In any case, the SE-Regulation may have limited effect on jurisdictional competition 
since new companies will likely not decide to form as SEs at all. Such companies have nothing 
to be gained from a potential conversion to another national law at the expense of more stringent 
initial requirements, particularly in the case of minimum capital requirements.
Existing companies, however, will probably become SEs, even though existing 
companies registered in non-co-determination Member States might fear the added costs of 
subjecting themselves to a strict co-determination regime by merging with a company in such a 
212
 Id.
213
 See European Company Becomes Reality, LAW., Oct. 22, 2001, at 2 (“EU Internal Market 
Commissioner Frits Bolkestein said that by using an SE, companies would be able to ‘expand and 
restructure their cross-border operations without the costly and time-consuming red tape of having to set 
up a network of subsidiaries.’”)
214
 See JURISDICTION COMPETITION, supra note 209 (noting that it is uncertain what the tax consequences 
of SE mergers will be); HM Treasury, A Competitive and Modern Business Tax System, HERMES 
DATABASE, Dec. 10, 2003 (noting that the SE statute does not mention tax law).
215
 See Friedrich Kubler, A Shifting Paradigm of European Company Law?, p. 15. 
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Member State.216 The possibility of merging and subsequently becoming national companies of 
another Member State with less strict law should induce existing companies to form as SEs, with 
the exception of Germany and other countries where the costs will be too severe. The emigration 
obstacles that existed under Daily Mail will thus be lifted, and in the longer run, such restrictions 
will ultimately be lifted even in the most obstinate Member States, or German corporations will 
miss out on the “reorganization of European industries across the traditional borderlines” and 
valuable merger opportunities.217  The result will inevitably be a full jurisdictional race in the 
longer run, and an almost complete jurisdictional race in the shorter run.  This will effectively 
crush the real seat doctrine, and for better or worse, will supplant the invisible hand of the 
indirect efficiency of laxness for the stakeholder theory, with its ostensible virtues.  
6. CONCLUSION
The four company law cases that we have considered progressively eroded strict Member 
States’ abilities to prevent jurisdictional competition. Daily Mail took the first modest step in 
this course by declining to announce an anti-circumvention principle. Instead, it contemplated 
that freedom of establishment would conflict with national company law namely when a 
Member State could assert that a company was a creature of its law. Although effectively anti-
circumventionist in the singular factual situation which it narrowly contemplated, it served as the 
basis for holdings that would severely limit a state’s ability to restrict jurisdictional competition.
Daily Mail should therefore not be viewed as a guise to subvert the freedom of 
establishment. Instead, Daily Mail was the beginning of an attempt to carefully reconcile 
216
 A merger of this type would dilute shareholder rights regarding control of the Board.  See John 
Plender, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2003, at 17 (“But . . . under the new legal regime such a merger decision 
could only be taken by statutory majority and with specific protections for minority shareholders.”).
217
 See Friedrich Kubler, A Shifting Paradigm of European Company Law?, p. 17.
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vestiges of previously existing notions of company national law with Articles 43 and 48 of the 
EC Treaty.
Centros took another step down the path of permitting jurisdictional competition. It 
explicitly stated that circumvention in itself was not contrary to the freedom of establishment. 
Instead, it re-articulated Daily Mail’s basic contention that a Member State had no power over a 
company, unless that company was a creature of its law. In so doing, it announced that the 
E.C.J. would not stretch Daily Mail to further the anti-circumventionist cause.  At the same time, 
it also suggested that Member States might nevertheless be free to restrict companies that carried 
on trades, professions or businesses, without violating the freedom of establishment.
Uberseering was the first and the only case that made the EC directly confront the 
tension between traditional national company law and the freedom of establishment. Daily Mail
had held that a Member State having legal personality was sufficient to lift Articles 43 and 48 
impediments to restrictions, despite a transfer of the management office. Uberseering forced the 
Court to answer whether real seat Member States could simply assert that a company became a 
creature of its national law, even when another Member State had not ceased to confer legal 
personality. No matter what its answer, some traditional notion of what it had meant to be a 
company under national law would have fallen.
At the end of the day, the Court concluded either that the real seat’s notion of legal 
personality would yield to the state of incorporation’s notion, or that a second Member State 
cannot assert legal personality to the detriment of another State.  In any event, the Court’s 
decision further prevented Member States from restricting the exportation of national laws.
Inspire Art was a last attempt to obtain power to prevent a jurisdictional competition in 
company law. Strict Member States sought to favorably apply the unfavorable after their legal 
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personality attempt had failed in Uberseering.  With few avenues left, strict Member States 
sought to favorably apply the unfavorable by basing its minimum capital requirements on 
Centros. Although this case had held such requirements contrary to the freedom of 
establishment, it asserted a potential exception for restrictions that dealt with the carrying on of 
trades, professions or businesses.
The Court, however, had other plans. The carrying on exception was not applied, even 
though the Danish law in question did not deal with registration requirements. The Court 
concluded that it was sufficient that the restrictions were mandatorily applied and had the effect 
of creating a heavy burden for companies seeking to form.
At a minimum, Inspire Art all but closes the strict Member States’ final door for 
obtaining further power to prevent a jurisdictional competition with regard to certain issues. The 
fate of co-determination in freedom of establishment jurisprudence will likely still have to be 
determined.  This is because co-determination may not sufficiently effect company formation in 
the same way as do minimum capital requirements. In addition, co-determination more properly 
may have been what the Court contemplated in Centros when it announced the carrying on 
exception.
Case analysis of the most recent freedom of establishment company law cases 
demonstrates that it is unlikely that Member States will have power beyond Daily Mail’s 
emigration scenario to limit jurisdictional competition. This power, even if no other measures 
are possible, will likely prove to be sufficient for preventing existing companies from 
jurisdictionally shopping as the tax burden will outweigh any conceivable legal advantage. Such 
barriers, however, are not applicable to new company formation. In new company formation, 
jurisdictional shopping will remain a strong possibility.
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Jurisdictional shopping does not necessarily imply a race to laxity. A Member State must 
have an incentive to develop relaxed laws, or such a race will not obtain.  EC Member States, 
unlike Delaware, do not have adequate tax fiscal incentives.
However, the current body of U.S. scholarship suggests that a race to laxity is 
economically efficient by its nature, albeit in an indirect manner. Efficiency in itself might thus 
be an adequate financial incentive. This naturally depends on whether EC Member States 
progressively come to accept this body of U.S. scholarship. Under the currently dominant 
stakeholder theory in the EC, a race would not be efficient because it would adversely affect the 
rights of creditors and workers.  In addition, a race might not be efficient in the EC even under a 
shareholder theory. This is because shareholders of existing companies would be at a 
disadvantage to take advantage of relaxed rules vis-à-vis shareholders of new companies.
On October 8, 2004, the SE statute was enacted, which governed the formation of 
specifically EC companies. This statute, by imposing co-determination and minimum capital 
requirements on SE companies, threatened to effectively undo the effect of the E.C.J.’s recent 
case law opening the way to a possibility of jurisdictional competition.  However, as Professor 
Kubler discovered, a potential exists for SE companies to merge with subsidiaries and to 
subsequently become governed by national company law after a two year period. This would 
effectively allow existing companies to export the law of a new home state, without even the 
expense of setting up subsidiaries.  In the short run, certain Member States such as Germany may 
evade the SE statute by imposing costs on dissolution, but such Member States will miss out on 
the internationalization and reorganization of European industry.  In the long run, it appears clear 
that such Member States will be forced to accept the full implications of the SE statute and full 
jurisdictional competition will ensue, to the detriment of the stakeholder theory values.
